For the r/javascript Community
AI wrote the JavaScript. That doesn't mean it's safe.
We scan, then we forget. You keep what you want.
The model autocompletes a route handler, you wire up an npm package, the tests pass, and it ships — all before lunch. That speed is the whole point of modern JavaScript work, but AI-generated code is fluent, not secure. It will happily write el.innerHTML = userInput, build a query by string concatenation, leave eval() in a parser, or pull a dependency with a known advisory — and none of that shows up in a green test run. AllScanTool is the safety pass between “it works” and “it's deployed.” Paste your frontend or Node.js source and the Delivery-Layer Engine flags XSS sinks, injection, unsafe eval() and child_process calls, prototype pollution, and hardcoded secrets — each with the line number, a severity, and a concrete fix. It runs in your browser and forgets your code the moment you leave. No logs. No storage. No retention. Your code stays private.
AI-generated JavaScript looks correct. The risk is what it hides.
These are the recurring ways modern JS — frontend and Node.js — ships to production with a vulnerability the test suite never noticed.
innerHTML and dangerous DOM sinks
AI reaches for innerHTML, insertAdjacentHTML, and document.write with user data attached. It renders fine and opens a clean DOM-based XSS hole.
npm packages pulled in without review
An npm install the model suggested drags in transitive dependencies — some with known advisories — that nobody on the team has actually read.
Injection in Node.js backends
Generated route handlers concatenate request values into SQL, NoSQL filters, or shell commands. Looks idiomatic; ships an injection vector straight to the server.
eval() and the Function constructor
eval(), new Function(), and dynamic require() on input show up in AI-written parsers and config loaders — small lines, remote code execution risk.
Prototype pollution from merged objects
Deep-merge and Object.assign patterns over untrusted JSON let __proto__ through. Subtle, framework-wide, and exactly the kind of thing autocomplete misses.
Hardcoded secrets and tokens
API keys and connection strings end up inline in a config module or a client bundle — then committed and shipped to every visitor who opens devtools.
Ask AST
The questions JavaScript and Node.js developers actually run into shipping AI-assisted code — answered with the specific line, the severity, and the fix.
QCopilot wrote this component that sets innerHTML from a prop — is it an XSS risk before I ship it?
Paste it. AST traces whether untrusted data reaches that sink, flags the exact line, and shows the safe pattern — textContent, a framework-escaped binding, or sanitisation — so the render stays the same without the hole.
QI let the model scaffold an Express route that runs a DB query — is it injectable?
AST checks whether req values reach your query unparameterised, marks the severity, and rewrites it with bound parameters for your driver — pg, mysql2, Mongo — so the generated handler is actually safe to deploy.
QThis npm package has millions of weekly downloads — does that make it safe to use?
Popularity is not a security audit. Paste the code or the snippet you are calling and AST flags dangerous APIs, eval(), and risky input handling in what you actually use — so you judge the code, not the download count.
QThere is an eval() in some AI-generated parser code — how do I know if it is exploitable?
AST checks whether anything user-controlled can reach that eval() or new Function(), shows the path the input takes, marks the severity, and suggests a safe replacement like JSON.parse or an explicit allowlist.